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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-HOLOCAUST CULTURE iS coming to be understood as a 
transition between two regimes of memory. An initial period of repression gave 
way, after twenty years or more, to one of obsession. Before he turns to a careful 
discussion of the second of these regimes in international context, Omer Bartov 
deals with the first only briefly and then in largely negative and summary terms.' In 
this short comment, I want to try to complicate this somewhat undifferentiated 
account of the first twenty years after the war. The period is critical, I suggest, 
because it may offer some important resources for escaping the vicious circle of 
enemies and victims that Bartov identifies. 
In the immediate postwar years, Germans as well as Jews in Europe, the United 
States, and Israel rarely posed the Holocaust as a matter of explicit public 
reflection. Instead, they adopted what Bartov calls the "official state perceptions" 
in their respective lands, which often construed the war as "a site of near universal 
victimhood" and atrocities as "crimes against humanity" rather than culturally 
specific acts of violence. In the newer regime, dating from sometime in the 1960s, 
the events received the designation "Holocaust" and were reinterpreted as a more 
specifically Jewish tragedy. A number of contemporary writers tend to take a 
harshly critical view of the newer regime, largely reducing the canonization and 
quasi-pathological attention the Holocaust has received to political appropriation 
and instrumentalization.2 It nonetheless remains more familiar and acceptable- 
especially by contrast to the older regime and apparent "inability to mourn" that 
together preceded it. 
But is this hierarchy valid? The representational and ethical defects in the initial 
style of response in post-Holocaust culture are obvious. Most significantly, it did not 
adequately capture the extent to which Jews specifically had been victimized and to 
which Germans specifically were guilty as genocidal aggressors. As Bartov remarks, 
"the genocide of the Jews . .. was left largely unexplained for many years following 
1 Omer Bartov, "Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust," AHR 103 
(June 1998): 787-89, 800. 
2 See most notably Peter Novick, "Holocaust Memory in America," in James E. Young, ed., Th1e Art 
of MAlenoiy: Holocaulst Memorials in Histoiy (New York, 1994); and Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The 
Israelis and the Holocalust, Haim Watzman, trans. (New York, 1993). In addition to the other works 
Bartov cites at 801 n56, see Efraim Sicher, ed., Breaking Ciystal: Writing and Mernoiy after Alschwitz 
(Urbana, Ill., 1998). For a challenging response to the one-dimensionality of Novick's argument, see 
Mark J. Greif, "The American Transformation of the Holocaust, 1945-65" (AB thesis, Harvard 
University, 1997). 
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the Holocaust, whether by historiography, legal discourse, documentaries, or other 
forms of representation."3 The motivations for the adoption of the first post- 
Holocaust regime are also readily apparent: it allowed a unity of democracies 
against Communism and fostered a reintegration of the Jews into national cultures 
in which their place had been challenged. 
But it is not enough to leave the matter there. For while it had major and 
undeniable vices, the approach also had some noteworthy virtues. It implicitly or 
explicitly recognized that there had been "a mosaic of victims" (including leftists, 
Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, the disabled, the mentally ill, the criminally deviant, 
and the elderly) during World War 11.4 In addition, it may have succeeded, far 
better than the more divisive regime that followed, at including vast numbers of 
non-Jews in worldwide moral reflection and reform. Inasmuch as every regime of 
memory is equally a vision of the future, the construction of the war in this first style 
emphasized intercultural cooperation, rather than ethnic self-defense. 
The most significant instantiation of this early style of response is perhaps the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which, surprisingly 
enough, does not find a mention in Bartov's reflections on genocide, even though 
it is (along with related conventions) the major international legal instrument 
available to combat the problem today. However easy it is to question the 
philosophical foundations of the document and the spotty record of the movement 
it spawned, they remain among the most striking and practical legacies of the first 
regime of post-Holocaust culture.5 
This all-too-brief contrast between the two regimes of memory may seem to imply 
a difficult but necessary choice between two incompatible approaches to the 
Holocaust, each with characteristic advantages and shortcomings. It is as if the 
"deep structure" that A. D. Moses has recently discerned in scholarship on the 
event, which divides commentators into universalists and particularists based on 
their precritical ethical affiliations, not only conditioned response to the Holocaust 
generally in the past but must also govern it in the future.6 But I would reject this 
conclusion. A closer examination of the first regime of post-Holocaust culture may 
lead not so much to an inversion of the putative hierarchy between the two regimes 
as to a rejection altogether of the terms in which it is drawn. 
The case of France and French Jewry may most usefully illustrate the complexity 
of the first regime of memory, demonstrating that it did not everywhere and always 
exclude recognition of the particularity of Jewish suffering, even though it did often 
3 Bartov, "Defining Enemies, Making Victims," 788. 
4 For this phrase and on this topic, see Michael Berenbaum, ed., A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews 
Persectuted and Murdered by the Nazis (New York, 1990). 
As Jacques Maritain, an important member of the original UNESCO committee in charge of 
formulating the project, famously remarked on the issue of foundations, "Yes, we agree about the 
rights, but on condition no one asks us why." Quoted in Mary Ann Glendon, "Reflections on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights," First Things, no. 82 (April 1998): 24. A helpful recent 
introduction to an immense literature on the text (including important drafting history) and the 
movement appears in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, eds., International Huiman Rights in Context: 
Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford, 1996). Technically, of course, the declaration is not a legal instrument, 
only a "standard of achievement." 
6 A. D. Moses, "Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics,` 
History and Theory 37, no. 2 (1998): 194-219. Moses himself argues that his categories are ideal types 
and that some figures straddled or challenged the boundary between them. 
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draw universalist consequences from that recognition, given the political, theolog- 
ical, or more generally humanistic commitments of important contributors to the 
discourse. This case helps show that universalizing abstraction from events is not 
always escapist or repressive, though it will always have a particularized background 
and motivation (the problem for the historian lies in determining what these are).7 
It is certainly true that the immediate aftermath of the war in France featured an 
attempt, despite the upheavals of the prior two decades and the scores of 
testimonies offered by survivors, to revive>the republican synthesis that distin- 
guished French Jewry in modern times.8 Coupled with the so-called "Vichy 
syndrome," this consensus led to notably problematic consequences in the repre- 
sentation of the immediate past, extending from Jean-Paul Sartre's R4flexions sur la 
question juive (translated as Anti-Semite and Jew), which understood Jewish identity 
essentially as hostile construction, to Alain Resnais' documentary Night and Fog, 
which, as Bartov notes, did not confront the fact of Jewish victimhood at all.9 
But the story is more complicated than these examples suggest. France also 
tended to be the country that pioneered versions of this first regime of memory with 
a slightly different cast, frequently because of the contribution of Jews and other 
survivors, which were all the more remarkable because of the international silence 
that otherwise reigned on the topic. Despite recent allegations of a cultural 
Sonderweg when it comes to the rights tradition,10 for example, the French made an 
important contribution to the Universal Declaration not only through the efforts of 
intellectuals such as Jacques Maritain but also through the primary draftsmanship 
of the French-Jewish jurist and later Nobelist Rene Cassin. Far from ignoring 
Jewish suffering, Cassin and others in the movement had the sense that they were 
doing it honor. 
At a more literary-cultural level, France enjoyed an early consensus on the 
necessity of interfaith dialogue about the meaning of the Holocaust; French-Jewish 
intellectuals and novelists cooperated in forging a philosophical reflection of the 
broader universalist regime of memory of which they were a part. Elie Wiesel, 
whose encounter with the Catholic writer Francois Mauriac proved critical in the 
origins of the official text of Night, is the most spectacular example, but there are 
many others.1" While modern ears trained on the music of the newer regime of 
memory are often alert to the absences and dissonances in this literature, they are 
7 For a critical earlier example, see Dale Van Kley, "From the Lessons of French History to Truths 
for All Times and All People: The Historical Origins of an Anti-Historical Declaration," in Van Kley, 
ed., The French Idea of Freedom: The Old Regime and the Declaration of Rights of 1789 (Stanford, Calif., 
1994). 
8 Annette Wieviorka's works explore these issues, especially her monumental study on testimonies, 
Deportation et genocide: Entre la memoire et l'oubli (Paris, 1992). Also, Maud S. Mandel, "The Strange 
Silence: France, French Jews, and the Return to Republican Order following World War II," 
Presentation, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, April 15, 1998. 
On the interwar background, Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refuigee Crisis, 
1933-1942 (Stanford, Calif., forthcoming), will make an important new contribution. 
9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Reflexions sur la question juive (Paris, 1946); English transl., Anti-Semite and Jew, 
George J. Becker, trans. (New York, 1948); for Resnais, see Bartov, "Defining Enemies, Making 
Victims," 788 n 31. But compare Andrew Hebard, "Disruptive Histories: Toward a Radical Politics of 
Remembrance in Alain Resnais's Night and Fog," New German Criticism no. 71 (Spring-Summer 1997): 
87-114. 
10 Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley, Calif., 1992). 
l Elie Wiesel, La nuit (Paris, 1958); for a problematic account of Mauriac's role, see Naomi 
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insensible to some of their valuable harmonies and functional importance. For they 
were extremely influential, not least on the non-Jewish population, who were likely 
to have had their exposure to the Holocaust through these materials. 
Early French post-Holocaust culture also proved significant in shaping elite 
reflection. To give just one example, the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's com- 
ments regarding the universalist basis and implications of both Jewish identity and 
Jewish victimhood as well as his advocacy of a new humanism based on the figure 
of the other were far from incidental to his broadly influential treatment of current 
philosophical issues in general.12 This first regime of memory is therefore critical 
for understanding at least one dimension of the ethical motivation in the origins of 
so-called postmodernism, most notably the early work of Jacques Derrida. Inter- 
estingly enough, the universalizing approach to the genocide informed the work of 
philosophers most renowned for their championship of difference. But this paradox 
is not merely a feature of these philosophers' work: it helped define a more 
embracing cultural project committed to thinking out the relationship between the 
universal and the particular anew in the post-Holocaust context. 
These comments are highly introductory. But they do imply that a good deal of 
historicist caution is required to appreciate the complexity, significance, and legacy 
of initial responses to the horror of war and genocide. In particular, it is important 
to avoid the unexamined premise that reactions to events that antedate contem- 
porary canons of interpretation were for that reason alone evasive, misguided, or 
simply wrong. Even those confident enough to assert a standard of response against 
which to measure all others should understand it less as a direct and obvious 
inference from events than as a painstaking, indirect, and mediated achievement. 
The study of memory is a requirement because it allows distinction among rival 
strands in the history of interpreting an event for the purposes of comparison and 
more critical affiliatiom.13 I have argued that Bartov's "vicious circle of defining 
enemies and making victims," while powerful, did not wholly determine post- 
Holocaust culture. The "other ways to view reality" that he so admirably posits and 
advocates are not totally absent from the historical record.14 A closer examination 
of the first, international style in post-Holocaust culture, notably in France, may 
prove more rewarding than Bartov suggests, as intellectuals work toward a world in 
which enemies and victims finally become things of the past. 
Seidman, "Elie Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage," Jewish Social Studies, new ser., 3 (Fall 1996): 
1-19. 
12 Emmanuel Levinas, "Etre juif," Confluences 7, nos. 15-17 (1947): 260; L'humanisme de l'autre 
homme (Montpellier, 1972); Samuel Moyn, "Judaism against Paganism: Emmanuel Levinas's Response 
to Heidegger and Nazism in the 1930s," History and Memory 10 (Spring 1998): 25-58. 
13 While Jan Assmann asserts the possibility of separating "history" and "mnemohistory," Dominick 
LaCapra more plausibly suggests that the categories are neither fully identical nor fully distinct. See 
Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 
esp. 14; and LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998), chap. 1. Earlier, see 
LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theoty, Trauma (Ithaca, 1994), 11-12n; and Amos 
Funkenstein, Perceptions of Jewish History (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), chap. 1. 
14 Bartov, "Defining Enemies, Making Victims," 772, 816. 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW OCTOBER 1998 
1186 Samuel Moyn 
Samuel Moyn is a graduate student in the Department of History at the 
University of California, Berkeley. He received an MA there in 1995 after 
graduating from Washington University in St. Louis summa cum laude in 1994. 
Moyn has written other articles and reviews published in History and Memory, 
the Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, and German Politics and Society. He studies 
European intellectual history and is working on his dissertation. 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW OCTOBER 1998 
